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WILLFUL BLINDNESS AS MERE EVIDENCE
Gregory M. Gilchrist*
The willful blindness doctrine at criminal law is well-established
and generally fits with moral intuitions of guilt. It also stands in direct
tension with the first principle of American criminal law: legality. This
Article argues that courts could largely preserve the doctrine and
entirely avoid the legality problem with a simple shift: willful blindness
ought to be reconceptualized as a form of evidence.
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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of willful blindness—that a person can be guilty of
knowing criminality when she is merely aware of a high risk and
avoids knowledge of a key fact1—is both harmful and unnecessary.
American courts have consistently embraced the doctrine even as they
struggle to explain it.2 The result is that the version of willful blindness
approved by most courts, including the Supreme Court, is contrary to
fundamental principles of legality.
It never had to be this way. This Article offers a simple
alternative. Willful blindness has thrived because, like most
longstanding criminal law principles, it fits basic moral intuitions. And
like many longstanding criminal law principles, it also serves more
efficient law enforcement. The basic idea, that a person might be guilty
of a knowing violation upon proof of awareness of a high likelihood
of the guilty fact plus aversion from learning that fact, resonates. The
person who carries a package across a known drug trafficking border
for an exorbitant fee will not be immune because he took care to avoid
learning with certainty about the contents of the package.
The problem with the doctrine, however, is that courts generally
fail to explain how the willfully blind defendant could be culpable for
a crime of knowledge. Moreover, when courts do endeavor to explain
willful blindness, the dominant explanation amounts to boldly
amending statutory codes by judicial fiat. In such cases, courts have
recognized that willful blindness is something less than knowledge
and concluded the willfully blind are equally culpable and ought to be
punished by analogy. Few concepts are more odious to the rule of law
than punishment by analogy,3 and yet this common and important
doctrine of American criminal law is predicated on nothing more.4

1. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011).
2. Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1353
(1992).
3. Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 612
(1956) (describing many vagrancy prosecutions in these terms); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1972) (crimes defined by analogy of harm, “though long
common in Russia, are not compatible with our constitutional system” (footnote omitted)). Nullem
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege. Nullem crimen sine lege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019); nulla poena sine lege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
4. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 756 (“The traditional rationale for this doctrine
is that defendants who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those who have actual
knowledge.”).
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The irony is that this problem was entirely avoidable and the
method for avoiding the problem has been specifically identified in
dissents to the two most significant court cases considering the
doctrine.5 Each dissent, by Judge and later Justice Kennedy, has been
all but ignored by courts. This Article offers reason to return to the
mere evidence conception of willful blindness.
It is easy to see that the doctrine elucidated by Justice Kennedy
avoids the legality problems generally associated with willful
blindness.6 Less obvious, but perhaps equally important, is the
likelihood that Justice Kennedy’s conception of willful blindness
would generate more or less the same outcomes.7 Fundamentally, this
Article contends that willful blindness reflects the loose epistemology
of criminal law coupled with the fact that common sense moral
intuitions, more than any single analytic approach, undergird criminal
law. Jurors will often punish the willfully blind, and they are likely to
do so whether the doctrine is introduced as a substitute for knowledge
or not. If, indeed, this is a doctrine without a difference, then there is
no reason to hold onto it and its concomitant problems.
The Article proceeds in seven parts. Part I introduces the doctrine
and its problems, concluding with three possible ways of
conceptualizing willful blindness. Part II examines the most common
and most problematic concept of willful blindness: the substitute
account. Part III introduces the mere evidence approach, pursuant to
which the evidence that amounts to willful blindness permits, but does
not demand, an inference of actual knowledge. Part IV demonstrates
that the mere evidence conception of willful blindness fits with
criminal law’s heuristic approach to epistemology. Part V
demonstrates that the mere evidence account fits with the historical
development of willful blindness. Part VI offers support for the
contention that formally adopting and applying the mere evidence
approach will lead to largely the same outcomes. That is, those who
would be found guilty under a legally suspect substitution approach
will likely also be found guilty under a mere evidence approach. This
conclusion is, necessarily, offered as a hypothesis; only by adopting a
mere evidence model could we conclusively know whether outcomes
5. See id. at 772 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 706 (9th
Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part VI.
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would be meaningfully affected. Recognizing this limit, the Article
offers reason to believe the outcomes would likely not vary greatly,
premised in the basic conception of criminal guilt as a reflection of
moral intuition. Finally, Part VII acknowledges problems with the
mere evidence account.
No one can maintain that the doctrine of willful blindness is
undertheorized.8 Shelves could be filled with the literature digging to
great depths to place this important doctrine on firmer ground. There
is, however, a chasm too rarely crossed between the scholarship and
caselaw of willful blindness. This Article offers an admittedly simple
bridge guiding courts to a spot on which this important doctrine can
better rest.
And the doctrine is important. Introducing his recent book on
willful blindness, Alexander Sarch asks: “Can bad epistemic habits
make one more culpable in ways the criminal law should recognize?”9
As the basic tools of knowledge shift from curated and edited books,
journals, and papers to a universally accessible and amendable set of
ipse dixits, everyone ought to share concern about bad epistemic
habits. People can avoid knowledge even as they appear to be seeking
or accumulating it. Such is a terror of the internet age, and it is
reasonable to ask how, if at all, the criminal law ought to respond.
Additionally, ignorance has a special role within the corporate
form.10 People complain when a corporation engages in grievous
wrongdoing, yet no high-level officials are held accountable.11 The
corporate form frequently renders individual prosecutions difficult.12
Corporate hierarchies, by design, isolate functions and thus
knowledge.13 When one considers whether a corporate executive is
8. Most recently, Alexander Sarch’s book, ALEXANDER SARCH, CRIMINALLY IGNORANT:
WHY THE LAW PRETENDS THAT WE KNOW WHAT WE DON’T (2019), makes a significant
contribution to the literature. Sarch offers a powerful account of willful blindness that could help
address the accountability gap in corporate criminal prosecutions. Ultimately, as will be explored
further below, Sarch’s theory is one that allows substitution of knowledge by something different,
premised on comparable culpability. Rich as his approach is, absent legislative change, it does not
avoid the legality concerns that have haunted the doctrine since its inception.
9. Id. at xi.
10. J.S. Nelson, Disclosure-Driven Crime, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1487 (2019).
11. Id. at 1552 (“The very natural and immediate reaction that many observers have to
revelations of large-scale corporate wrongdoing such as inside VW and other companies is to
demand criminal prosecution of the top executives in charge.”).
12. Gregory M. Gilchrist, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crime, 34 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 335, 351 (2018).
13. Id. at 361–62.
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culpable for wrongdoing that occurred on her watch, questions quickly
turn to what she knew and when she knew it. Often, the answers will
be that she simply did not know about the wrongdoing, but that she
was aware of a culture or pattern of practices that, at least with the
benefit of hindsight, led to the wrongdoing. In such cases, prosecutors
will turn to theories of willful blindness.14 The executive may be on
the hook for knowing culpability even absent proof that she knew.15
Epistemic uncertainty, disregard for truth in the internet age, and
corporate governance during a time in which corporations exert ever
greater influence over people’s lives on a global scale demand
attention. Each will generate calls for applying, or even bolstering,
doctrines of willful blindness.16 To the extent these calls urge adoption
of new statutes,17 they introduce the normative question of whether—
legality concerns aside—ignorant wrongdoing in some cases ought to
be punished as knowing wrongdoing.18 This Article sidesteps this
question, in part because code-wide coherent statutory change to the
relevant laws is so very unlikely. This Article addresses what Sarch
labels the practitioner’s problem: “Is there a sufficient legal basis for
courts to apply the relevant imputation principle?”19 This is contrasted
with the lawmaker’s problem: “Would it be normatively sound for the
lawmaker . . . to adopt the relevant imputation principle?”20
Willful blindness is being applied by the courts now. It is being
done in a manner deeply at odds with foundational legality principles.
The problem is likely to get worse, not better, as prosecutors face
greater demands to pursue theories of willful blindness. Courts need
an approach that works immediately, and this Article offers one.
The simplicity of the approach, I believe, is its greatest benefit.
The law, as described, defined, and applied by the courts, has never
14. Nelson, supra note 10, at 1559 (“Judge Rakoff and others have suggested that prosecutors
could ease their burden of proving intent in these white collar cases by relying on ‘willful blindness’
or ‘conscious disregard.’”).
15. See id.
16. See SARCH, supra note 8, at 212–30 (2019) (advocating for a new rule of motivated
ignorance that would substitute for the mens rea of recklessness in certain cases whether the actor
was actually unaware of the risk generated by her conduct).
17. Id. at 154; Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and
the “Equal Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 62.
18. SARCH, supra note 8, at 155 (offering a normative theory of equal culpability to support
statutory change).
19. Id. at 147.
20. Id.
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had great patience for nuanced epistemology. The mere evidence
approach to willful blindness benefits from being simple, coherent,
and consistent with moral intuitions.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF WILLFUL BLINDNESS
Willful blindness is particularly important because of the
preeminence of mens rea to criminal law.21 Almost all crimes require
mens rea, and knowledge is a particular mental state on which many
crimes stand or fall. Was the defendant aware of a specified fact or
result at the time she acted? If so, she acted knowingly. If not, she did
not.
To knowingly cause the death of another is generally punishable
as murder;22 to do so recklessly is deemed less serious and generally
punished as mere manslaughter.23 Knowing possession of
contraband,24 failing to pay taxes in violation of a known legal duty,25
laundering money known to be proceeds of illegal activity26—each of
these crimes turns in significant part on what the defendant knew at
the time of a particular act or omission.27
That the criminal law relies so heavily on subjective mental states
to define crimes is both understandable and problematic.
Understandable, because the concept that an actor’s mental state is
relevant to her culpability is so fundamental as to go largely
unquestioned.28 Problematic, because few concepts stymie philosophy

21. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Note, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932) (“For
hundreds of years the books have repeated with unbroken cadence that Actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea. ‘There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind,’ says Bishop. ‘It is
therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an
offence is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist.’”); see also Kimberly Kessler Ferzan,
Beyond Intention, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1147 (2008) (“Intentions play a central role in our
moral and legal discourse. As Justice Holmes famously remarked over one hundred years ago, the
intention with which we act is fundamental to our attributions of blameworthiness. It is intention
that distinguishes a stumble from a kick.”).
22. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
23. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
24. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018).
25. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2018).
26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2011).
27. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 841; 26 U.S.C. § 7201.
28. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28 (Oxford 2d ed. 2009) (“It is
characteristic of our own and all advanced legal systems that the individual’s liability to
punishment, at any rate for serious crimes carrying severe penalties, is made by law to depend,
among other things, on certain mental conditions.”).
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more than cognition and the mind.29 That said, the criminal law has
developed and continues to function in a state of contented ignorance
as to the epistemic and ontological challenges related to the human
mind, relying instead on a folksy psychology that, in truth, we all
recognize even where it lacks precision or accuracy.30
In this vein, where guilt is predicated on knowingly acting or
causing a result, juries are instructed:
The term “knowingly”, as used in these instructions to
describe the alleged state of mind of [the defendant], means
that
[he][she]
was conscious and aware of
[his][her][action][omission], realized what [he][she] was
doing or what was happening around [him][her], and did not
[act][fail to act] because of ignorance, mistake, or accident.31
That is, knowledge is basically described as awareness of a fact
or set of facts.32
A. Why Willful Blindness?
How can a prosecutor prove whether a defendant was actually
aware of particular facts at some time in the past? There is no record
of mental states. Indeed, the legal system has deftly side-stepped even
the question of what it means to have a particular mental state—of
what it is to be aware.33 This critical issue is taken as a given.
Between the lack of analytic rigor defining mental states, and
epistemic limits on our ability to study mental states, particularly past
mental states, prosecutors necessarily rely on circumstantial evidence

29. This problem is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that contemporary philosophy of mind
is dominated by reductionist theories that are quite difficult to reconcile with free will. This does
not mean no one tries, but more interesting is how little anyone cares. Day to day, we believe in
free will and likely will continue to do so, whatever philosophy of mind tells us. See Stephen J.
Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 56 (2004) (“We have no convincing
conceptual reason from the philosophy of mind, even when it is completely informed about the
most recent neuroscience, to abandon our view of ourselves as creatures with causally efficacious
mental states.”).
30. See id. at 51–53.
31. KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 17:04,
Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2020).
32. See id.
33. Keren Shapira-Ettinger, The Conundrum of Mental States: Substantive Rules and
Evidence Combined, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2577, 2579–80 (2007) (“Although classical dualism is
now almost unanimously philosophically discredited, quite remarkably it remains the dominant
view in the legal literature.”).
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to prove mens rea.34 The defendant was a sane person who was sober
and awake when he loaded the gun, aimed it at the victim, and pulled
the trigger? Under these circumstances, absent some evidence to the
contrary, common sense tells us that the defendant was aware that he
would cause death or serious bodily injury to the victim. If death
results, most people are comfortable concluding that the death was
caused knowingly, and possibly purposely.
Sometimes, however, proving knowledge circumstantially is
difficult, or maybe impossible. The defendant invested money in a
venture to secure a government contract in Saudi Arabia. The
defendant was aware that the business plan included a line item of
$400,000 described only, and opaquely, as an “agency fee.” The
defendant was aware that agency fees are often legitimately paid to
cover the costs of attorneys, notaries, and even line-waiters. And, there
is a record of the defendant asking, “isn’t $400,000 high for agency
fees on this project?” and not following up when the response was,
“don’t worry about how things are done in Saudi Arabia.” When it
turns out that $380,000 of that line item traveled through third parties
to bribe a foreign official to secure the contract, would we say the
defendant knew such bribe would occur? Plainly he was not actually
aware of the particular bribe to the particular official; he was insulated
from those facts. However, he was plainly aware of a risk that
something like this would occur. In this case, can the investor be said
to be an accomplice to the knowing bribery of a foreign official?
Cases like this call for application of the doctrine of willful
blindness, or deliberate ignorance. This doctrine allows prosecutors to
establish guilty knowledge by proving something other than actual
awareness. 35 In most jurisdictions, where proof of guilt requires
knowledge of X, the judge can instruct the jury it may convict if the
prosecution proves (1) that the defendant was aware of a high
probability that X; (2) that the defendant consciously took deliberate
actions not to learn X; and (3) that the defendant did not actually

34. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging
as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1130 (2010)
(“Because we cannot presently read someone’s mind to determine her mens rea at the time of the
crime, the jury is often told it can rely on the objective circumstances surrounding the criminal’s
conduct to draw inferences about her state of mind.”).
35. Charlow, supra note 2, at 1353 (“Wilful ignorance is employed in criminal law primarily,
and most controversially, as a mental state that satisfies a required mens rea of knowledge.”).
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believe X was untrue.36 That is, the judge can instruct the jury that guilt
requires knowledge of X, and then instruct the jury that it may convict
without finding knowledge of X.37
People who pay bribes for foreign officials are blameworthy.
People who invest money knowing it will be used to pay bribes to
foreign officials are comparably blameworthy. The investor who
recognized the risk of bribes, who expressed concern about an
exorbitant agency fee, and who accepted as comfort the admonition
not to worry about how things are done in another country seems
comparably blameworthy. Yet, the last of these is different than the
first two; she may not have actual awareness that the money will be
used to pay bribes.
In the bribery hypothetical, the facts would support the
conclusion that the defendant invested with an awareness of a high
probability that the project involved paying bribes. Moreover, the
investor’s failure to inquire further upon receiving such a patently
unsatisfactory answer to his reasonable question may be her conscious
avoidance of the issue because she did not want to know. In such a
case, most courts would issue a willful blindness instruction, allowing
the jury to convict based on this proof of less than knowledge.38
“The doctrine of willful blindness is well established.”39 The
basis for and nature of the doctrine, however, remains, at best,
muddled, and the majority conception of willful blindness represents
an affront to basic legality principles.40 Exactly how this court-made
doctrine functions is rarely clear. One possibility, the prevailing one,
36. See, e.g., United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2007).
37. See id. (approving the Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction on the willful blindness).
38. As described by the Ninth Circuit:
When knowledge is at issue in a criminal case, the court must first determine whether
the evidence of defendant’s mental state, if viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, will support a finding of actual knowledge. If so, the court must instruct the
jury on this theory. Actual knowledge, of course, is inconsistent with willful blindness.
The deliberate ignorance instruction only comes into play, therefore, if the jury rejects
the government’s case as to actual knowledge. In deciding whether to give a willful
blindness instruction, in addition to an actual knowledge instruction, the district court
must determine whether the jury could rationally find willful blindness even though it
has rejected the government’s evidence of actual knowledge. If so, the court may also
give a [willful blindness] instruction.
Id. at 922.
39. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011); see infra Part V.
40. Charlow, supra note 2, at 1353 (“[D]espite the use of wilful ignorance as a criminal mens
rea for over 100 years, there is tremendous confusion in this area of law and a lurking sense that
something is fundamentally awry.”).
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is that willful blindness represents a mental state distinct from
knowledge, but equally culpable.41 Accordingly, the defendant who
holds this mental state ought to be punished the same as the defendant
who actually knew. Returning to the bribery example, were there
another investor with the exact same circumstances, but who was told,
“we need the money to bribe the official” in response to her reasonable
inquiry about high agency fees, would we blame her more? Do we
really blame the intentionally ignorant investor less because he
avoided ever reaching actual awareness of the ultimate and critical
fact?
This account, however, generates two fundamental problems.
First, under this account willful blindness permits punishment by
analogy. Second, it stems from courts crafting common law crimes.
As such, this account of willful blindness is at odds with foundational
legality principles.42 These criticisms are not new, but they have not
limited dominance of the willful blindness doctrine.
This Article offers an alternative. Rather than conceiving of
willful blindness as distinct basis for convicting a defendant of a
knowing violation, courts ought to construe willful blindness as mere
evidence of knowledge. The facts of willful blindness come up often.
And, they often suggest culpability equal to that of one who acts with
actual knowledge. However, they also sometimes suggest something
more: actual knowledge.
Knowledge, like any subjective mental state, is difficult to prove
by direct evidence. Fact-finders are necessarily called upon to
extrapolate from certain evidence whether a defendant had a particular
mindset or not. Willful blindness is simply a condition from which
jurors could infer actual knowledge. The condition described by
willful blindness occurs with sufficient frequency that it has been
recognized and named, but ought to be understood as nothing more
than circumstantial evidence from which one might infer knowledge.
Understood as mere evidence, willful blindness avoids the legality
41. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 766.
42. Willful blindness is not uniquely problematic in this regard. For example, the doctrine of
voluntary intoxication, pursuant to which mens rea that is not present may, under certain
circumstances, be imputed to one who lacks the mens rea by reason of her intoxication suffers from
very similar legality problems. Likewise, entire substantive areas of law, like fraud, are so poorly
defined as to render the concept of notice farcical. A better conception of willful blindness will, of
course, do nothing to improve or remedy other failings of the American legal system. Hopefully,
that is not reason to abandon the effort. But see SARCH, supra note 8, at 161.
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problems generally associated with the doctrine, while maintaining
relative adherence to intuitions about equal culpability that led to its
creation. Moreover, the mere evidence account of willful blindness is
a better fit historically, philosophically, and functionally, than the
alternatives.
Anthony Kennedy wrote dissents in two seminal willful blindness
cases. First, as a judge, he dissented from United States v. Jewell,43 an
en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that willful blindness
constitutes a mental state distinct from knowledge that may
nonetheless be sufficient to establish a knowing violation.44 ThenJudge Kennedy maintained that “[w]hen a statute specifically requires
knowledge as an element of a crime . . . the substitution of some other
state of mind cannot be justified even if the court deems that both are
equally blameworthy.”45 Thirty-five years later, when the U.S.
Supreme Court described willful blindness as a well-established
acceptable substitute for knowledge in criminal cases,46 Justice
Kennedy did not waiver. Dissenting alone, he maintained that a
distinctive mental state cannot be a substitute for knowledge; it may,
however, be evidence of knowledge.47
No court has ever accepted Justice Kennedy’s position, and it has
received scant scholarly attention. This is surprising because he seems
to have the better argument as a matter of theory, but also because the
cost of adopting a mere evidence view of willful blindness is low,
while the benefit of avoiding the basic legality problems is significant.
Only by conceptualizing willful blindness as mere evidence can the
legality problems be avoided. At the same time, doing so is unlikely
to lead to significantly different results in individual cases: where the
facts of willful blindness are compelling, knowledge will often be
presumed anyway. As a substitute for knowledge, willful blindness is
something of a black eye to criminal justice; this Article suggests it
could just as easily be avoided, and therefore ought to be.

43. 532 F.2d 697, 708 (9th Cir. 1976).
44. Id. at 704 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 706.
46. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 766.
47. Id. at 774 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Facts that support willful blindness are often
probative of actual knowledge.”).
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B. Three Conceptions of Willful Blindness
Courts have not spent much time fussing over the analytic clarity
of the willful blindness doctrine; scholars have. Douglas Husak and
Craig Callender identified two different conceptions of willful
blindness variously offered by courts and commentators.48 First, under
the “actual knowledge account,” willful blindness is described as a
form of actual knowledge.49 Alternatively, under the “substitute
account,” willful blindness is described as a substitute for knowledge,
which itself is lacking.50 The latter introduces a distinct mental state
that can suffice for knowledge; the former defines knowledge to
include the conditions of willful blindness.
Too often this distinction is ignored: “Confusion about whether
the wilfully ignorant defendant possesses genuine knowledge or a
substitute for knowledge infects many of the hypotheticals and real
cases commentators use to illustrate the phenomenon. This confusion
is intolerable. An adequate understanding of wilful ignorance requires
commitment to one view or the other.”51 The confusion is intolerable,
but it is also understandable. Indeed, the Model Penal Code (the
“Code”) contributes to the confusion.
The Code provides that “[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence.”52
By defining knowledge to include a condition generally associated
with willful blindness, the Code seems to adopt the actual knowledge
approach, thus eliminating some of the legality problems. The
commentary specifies that this provision is meant to capture willful
blindness.53 Under this approach, substantive crimes that require a

48. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 42.
49. Id. (“According to this interpretation, wilful ignorance is a species of genuine knowledge;
thus the wilfully ignorant defendant does possess genuine knowledge after all.” (emphasis
omitted)).
50. Id. (“According to this interpretation, wilful ignorance is not a species of genuine
knowledge; although the wilfully ignorant defendant does not possess genuine knowledge, there is
a reason to treat him as though he did.” (emphasis omitted)).
51. Id. at 43–44.
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
53. Id. § 2.02 cmt. 9 (“Subsection (7) deals with the situation that British commentators have
denominated ‘wilful blindness’ or ‘connivance,’ the case of the actor who is aware of the probable
existence of a material fact but does not determine whether it exists or does not exist.”).
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knowing violation are, in more traditional parlance, really requiring a
violation committed with actual awareness or willful blindness.54
Yet, does the Code’s definition really capture willful blindness?
The commentary convolutes the issue with this statement: “The
inference of ‘knowledge’ of an existing fact is usually drawn from
proof of notice of high probability of its existence, unless the
defendant establishes an honest, contrary belief.”55 By referring to an
inference of knowledge from proof of awareness of a high probability,
the Code evokes the mere evidence approach advocated by this
Article. But that is at odds with the Code’s definitional approach
which would mandate a finding of knowledge, not merely allow its
inference, upon a showing of awareness of a high probability.56 Even
under the Code, confusion about the very nature and function of
willful blindness remains.57
Moreover, if the Code taking a pure definitional approach, and
defining knowledge as traditional knowledge or willful blindness, it
fails to properly capture willful blindness in the definition. Generally,
although not always, willful blindness requires more than an
awareness of a high probability; it also requires an active effort to
avoid learning the truth of the matter.58 The Code omits that.
Husak and Callender were right: there remains far too much
confusion between the actual knowledge and the substitute accounts
of willful blindness.59 There is, however, a third account: the method
of proof account. Considered as a method of proof, willful blindness
is neither a substitute for, nor a form of, knowledge; rather, willful
blindness is a set of relatively common conditions from which a
factfinder might infer actual knowledge.60 This is not itself a novel
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. § 2.02(7).
57. Some of the confusion likely stems from the imprecision of “high probability.” The
commentary explains that this language was adopted following concerns that the previously
proposed “substantial probability” left too little gap between knowledge and recklessness. Id.
§ 2.02 n.42. However, this clarification only highlights that under the Code the distinction between
recklessness and knowledge may be merely degree of certainty.
58. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011) (“While the Courts
of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful blindness in slightly different ways, all appear to agree
on two basic requirements: (1) The defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high
probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of
that fact.”).
59. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 43–44.
60. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1388.
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idea. Indeed, this is the very claim made deep in the commentary to
the Code (albeit perhaps unintentionally).61 And, it is that urged by
Justice Kennedy.62 It is, however, definitely not the prevailing
account.
The evidentiary account is generally disclaimed as different than
willful blindness.63 Courts have come to understand willful blindness
not merely as a method of proof, but rather as an alternative mental
state that can itself satisfy the statutory requirement of knowledge.64
By and large, courts have embraced the substitute approach.65
II. THE SUBSTITUTE ACCOUNT IS THE MOST PROBLEMATIC AND
MOST WIDELY ACCEPTED ACCOUNT OF WILLFUL BLINDNESS
One might fairly question whether this distinction has teeth: does
it really make a difference whether we understand willful blindness as
a substitute for actual knowledge, a form of actual knowledge, or as a
method of proving actual knowledge? It does.
The substitute approach instructs juries that there is an alternative
basis—other than knowledge—on which the defendant can be
convicted.66 Indeed, one of the clearer and less problematic model
instructions on willful blindness directs jurors that “the government
may prove that [the defendant] knew of that fact or circumstance if the
evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
deliberately closed (his) (her) eyes to what would otherwise have been
obvious to (him) (her).”67 It continues:
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 9.
62. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 774 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Facts that
support willful blindness are often probative of actual knowledge.”).
63. See, e.g., Alexander F. Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 101 n.7
(2017) (“The willful ignorance doctrine should not be confused with the distinct evidentiary rule
that evidence of willful ignorance can also constitute evidence from which a jury may infer actual
knowledge.”).
64. Id. at 101.
65. Id. at 101 n.7.
66. And this is how most courts conceptualize willful blindness, as an accepted substitute for
knowledge that the government may elect to prove in place of actual knowledge. See, e.g., United
States v. Poole, 640 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Generally, in criminal prosecutions, the
government elects to establish a defendant’s guilty knowledge by either of two different means.
The government may show that a defendant actually was aware of a particular fact or circumstance,
or that the defendant knew of a high probability that a fact or circumstance existed and deliberately
sought to avoid confirming that suspicion.”).
67. See COMM. ON MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THIRD CIR., MODEL CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 21 (2018), https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/model-civil-jury-table-contentsand-instructions.
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You must find that [the defendant] (himself) (herself)
[actually,] subjectively believed there was a high probability
of the existence of (state the fact or circumstance, knowledge
of which is required for the offense charged), consciously
took deliberate actions to avoid learning [used deliberate
efforts to avoid knowing] about it, and did not actually
believe that it did not exist.68
On this instruction, a juror would likely conclude that the
knowledge element of the offense is established by proof that:
1. the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact
in question;
2. the defendant took deliberate action to avoid learning
more about that fact; and
3. the defendant did not hold an actual belief the fact did not
exist.69
As a substitute account, these conditions precedent appear, by
themselves, to be sufficient to establish knowledge. As such, the
substitute account expands the set of conditions that establish
knowledge; it actually expands the definition of knowledge as the term
used in statutes. This expansion introduces most, though not all, of the
controversy surrounding willful blindness.
A. Willful Blindness and Legality
There are three primary problems associated with willful
blindness. First, judicial usurpation of the legislative function: when a
judicially crafted doctrine expands the scope of liability, the judiciary
has effectively legislated.70
Willful blindness is a common law doctrine by which courts
allow conviction for a knowing violation based on something other
than knowledge. Conviction by judicial caveat is a problem. Crimes
68. Id. at 22.
69. This Third Circuit model instruction does contain language consistent with the method of
proof approach advocated by this Article. In other parts of the instruction, the jurors would be told
that they “may find” knowledge based on such evidence. Id. at 21. The permissive language is
consistent with the method of proof approach. At best, however, this instruction is ambiguous
between the approaches, and, because it concludes with language lacking the permissive modifier,
see supra text accompanying note 8, it seems to favor the substitute approach.
70. Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea,
81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 194–95 (1990) (“[I]f the judiciary substitutes a lesser mental
state for statutorily prescribed knowledge, then it encroaches on the legislative prerogative of
defining criminal conduct.”).
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must be publicly defined ex ante, and there can be no punishment
absent law. This is a first principle of legality, an axiom on which the
rule of law is built.71 In the United States, this principal generally
means that an act cannot be punished absent a statute forbidding it.
There ought to be no common law of crime,72 because incremental
rule development predicated on specific cases and controversies
would necessarily entail—at certain points in history—punishment of
acts not publicly defined ex ante.73 Any punishment stemming from a
case that advanced the common law would be punishment based on
law not defined ex ante.
Robin Charlow argues that this is not actually a problem because
“‘knowledge’ is an ambiguous term, not having one fixed or limited
meaning . . . thus rendering the term open to judicial construction.”74
As a legal term, “knowledge” is indeed ambiguous.75 Therefore, courts
must construct its meaning in order to instruct juries to apply the term.
Yet, when courts conceive of “willful blindness” as something distinct
from and substitutable for “knowledge,” they are not constructing;
71. Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 335, 337 (2005) (“The doctrines that make up the ‘legality principle’ include the modern
abolition of common law penal doctrines, the modern prohibition of the judicial creation of penal
rules, special rules for the construction of penal statutes, the constitutional prohibition of ex post
facto penal laws, the due process bar of retroactive application of criminal rules, and the due process
invalidation of vague criminal statutes.”).
72. Rhode Island maintains a code provision allowing for punishment of common law offenses
not otherwise codified. “The possibility of significant punishment (here, up to five years’
incarceration) for an uncodified (indeed, unenacted) crime severely undercuts the usefulness of
having a criminal code at all.” Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American
Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2000).
73. Of course, in the United Kingdom and United States there is a long and continuing
tradition of common law crimes. The theft crimes have always been almost necessarily subject to
common law definition, if only because “[t]he field of theft offenses displays a variety as rich as
the imagination of those who seek dishonest gain.” GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW 3 (1978); see also Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (2011)
(“If one attempts to key one’s definition of fraud to descriptions of behaviors, new behaviors will
inevitably be invented, or will simply arise, that expose the definition as faulty and
underinclusive.”). But it’s not just theft; most crimes were developed at common law. Moreover,
although today, in the United States, most states expressly forbid punishment based on a crime not
defined by statute, see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.03 (LexisNexis 2021) (“No conduct
constitutes a criminal offense against the state unless it is defined as an offense in the Revised
Code.”), the line between statutory interpretation and common law development is blurry. Courts
continue to develop something that is probably most accurately described as the criminal common
law. Or, as Dan Kahan describes it, “[F]ederal criminal law, as a whole, is best conceptualized as
a regime of delegated common law-making.” Daniel M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal
Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 470 (1996).
74. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1355 n.11.
75. See infra Part III.
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they are legislating. If knowledge is defined to include willful
blindness, or if willful blindness is accepted as a form of
circumstantial evidence from which knowledge can be inferred, this
problem is averted. However, so long as the substitute account
dominates, this remains a real problem.
Second, punishment by analogy: the core justification courts give
for adopting willful blindness as a substitute for knowledge is that a
person who is willfully blind is equally culpable as one who actually
knows. There are few graver offenses against basic legality principles
than allowing the moral calculus of judges to substitute for ex ante
promulgation of rules.76 Alexander Sarch argues, to the contrary, that
where a fact (e.g., willful blindness) is equally helpful to explaining
why an action should be punished as another fact (e.g., knowledge),
the former is an acceptable substitute for the latter.77 He also makes a
compelling case that willful blindness makes the same contribution to
explaining why acting under that mental state is criminalized as
knowledge, thus satisfying his condition.78 However, this necessary
step in the equation is itself the problem of punishment by analogy.79
Perhaps acting with willful ignorance of a particular fact is equally as
wrong as acting with knowledge of that fact,80 but if willful blindness
is understood as something distinct from knowledge, that is immaterial
to the legality question. If the statute criminalizes the knowing action,
then only knowing action will suffice.81 To engage in the moral
76. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 96 (1820) (“It would be dangerous, indeed, to
carry the principle, that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its
provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity,
or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated.”).
77. Sarch argues:
[I]f mental state M is required for crime C because the presence of M makes a particular
kind of contribution to explaining why the conduct designated by C is criminalized in
the first place, then if another mental state, M*, makes exactly that same contribution (or
a greater contribution of the same kind) to explaining why that conduct is criminalized,
then M* should be allowed to substitute for M.
Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, supra note 63, at 134–35 (emphasis omitted).
78. Id. at 135.
79. Sarch argues to expand the analogy to punish merely reckless ignorance in some cases.
“[T]aking the traditional rationale [for punishing willful ignorance] seriously requires us to also
allow some forms of egregious non-willful ignorance—most importantly, reckless ignorance—to
substitute for knowledge in conditions of equal culpability.” Id. at 110.
80. And this is the position taken by courts justifying the doctrine. See, e.g., Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).
81. The solution, of course, would be to amend the statute to forbid willfully blind conduct.
This Article proceeds from the premise that this solution, however appealing, will not happen. See
supra text accompanying notes 49–50.
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calculus required to justify punishing something distinct from
knowledge is to punish by analogy. Legislatures are free to adopt such
reasoning ex ante, judges may not ex post.82
Finally, willful blindness generates some concern that defendants
may be erroneously convicted for mere recklessness or negligence.83
The substitute account is responsible for the first two problems, but
not the third. Shifting away from the substitute account of willful
blindness will eliminate core legality concerns, although it will not
completely eliminate concerns about wrongful convictions
surrounding willful blindness cases.84
B. Statutory Solutions
There remains one suggestion so sound that it would seem to
carry the day. If we mean to punish the willfully blind as we punish
the knowing, let us simply amend the statutes to punish knowing or
willfully blind behavior.85 There is hardly any analytic objection to
this alternative. One may object that the expansion of criminal liability
is itself problematic.86 Fine, but that is a different issue. If we accept
that moral intuition supports punishing the willfully blind, and that the
willfully blind ought to be punished, amending codes to punish this
mental state would avoid all legality concerns. Model Penal Code
section 2.02 could be amended to include a new subsection between
its definitions of “knowingly” and “recklessly.”87 Each statute
punishing knowing conduct could be amended to either include, or
82. Sarch acknowledges that only statutory reform can completely respond to these legality
concerns if a robust, substitute version of willful blindness is to be retained. See SARCH, supra note
8, at 154–55.
83. See, e.g., Harry L. Clark & Jonathan W. Ware, Limits on International Business in the
Petroleum Sector: CFIUS Investment Screening, Economic Sanctions, Anti-Bribery Rules, and
Other Measures, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 75, 115 (2011) (arguing that given the lack of
clarity in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act context, “in practice, the DOJ often seems to be guided
by what is essentially the lower negligence standard”).
84. It may, however, provide a better perspective about these concerns. Willful blindness cases
are really cases where the evidence of a core issue is limited. But when a core issue in a case is a
person’s mental state at some time in the past, the evidence is always and necessarily limited.
Willful blindness is a type of evidence—like contemporaneous recordings, surrounding
circumstances, common sense inferences—from which a juror can make reasonable conclusions
about a person’s mental state at particular time in the past. Judgments in willful blindness may be
mistaken, but so too they could be mistaken in cases relying on more traditional evidence of mental
state. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 774. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 68–69.
86. Sarch argues that expanding criminal liability to cover systemic ignorance is normatively
and instrumentally desirable. See SARCH, supra note 8, at 175–76.
87. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
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exclude, willfully blind conduct. Or, Code definitions of knowledge
could be amended to capture the disjunctive set of traditional
knowledge or willful blindness. If the law seeks to punish willfully
blind conduct as knowing conduct, then the positive law ought to say
as much. Then, everyone would be on notice, the legislature, not the
judiciary, would be defining the crime, and there would be little basis
for complaint.
Sadly, this solution is as unlikely as it is perfect. Our legal system
is comprised of (at least) fifty-one discrete systems, each with its own
code. The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code is often
heralded as a singular success in advancing our criminal codes, and
yet, even for that remarkable success, the codes of each state remain
as different as they are similar.88 The prospect of a uniform and
complete statutory fix to the problem of willful blindness is thus
bleak.89 Courts created this doctrine, and courts are best situated to
improve it.
III. THE MERE EVIDENCE ACCOUNT ALLOWS ACCOUNTABILITY
WITHOUT LEGALITY PROBLEMS
Recognizing willful blindness merely as a method of proof
empowers the jury to convict for actual knowledge based on proof of
willful blindness, but it prevents conviction for mere willful blindness.
The method of proof approach requires an additional cognitive leap:
to convict for a knowing violation based on willful blindness, jurors
would need to consider the facts of willful blindness in context and
conclude that the defendant “actually knew.” In this way, accepting
willful blindness as merely a form of evidence is superior to defining
knowledge to include willful blindness. While the definitional shift
would remedy the core legality problems in the substitute approach, it
would also necessarily broaden the scope of criminalized conduct, at
least marginally. Absent a showing that more expansive

88. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
5 (8th ed. 2019).
89. For more on the difficulty of code reform, see Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst
(and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, supra note 72, at 2 (“But the virtues of codification are
not always, or even usually, central to legislatures when they address these issues. No politician
runs for office on a platform to ‘increase internal consistency within the criminal law.’ Thus, while
criminal law attracts much legislative attention, criminal codes attract little. As a result, the
advantages of codification commonly are realized only imperfectly in American codes.”).
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criminalization is desirable,90 the better course would be to maintain
knowing violations as just that and allow juries to assess whether and
when the circumstances of willful blindness are sufficient to infer
knowledge.
Glanville Williams seems to have anticipated the method of proof
approach in a hypothetical:
An example of willful blindness in the proper sense is where
an employer knew that his business was being run in an
illegal way, and absented himself without having altered the
arrangements; he was held to “know” that the law was being
broken in his absence even though he had no direct
information about what was happening then.91
This particular example, however, has generated some criticism: “Ex
hypothesi, the employer ‘knew that his business was being run in an
illegal way.’ About what proposition, then, is he alleged to be wilfully
ignorant?”92
The query is fair, and plainly teed up by a hypothetical that posits
knowledge in an effort to establish knowledge. But the answer is also
clear: the employer was willfully ignorant as to the actual facts of
criminal conduct. For example, the tavern owner might be aware that
illegal gambling occurs on the premises in his absence, yet he might
have no actual information about who gambles, how much, in which
room, on what game, and at what time. In that case, he is willfully
ignorant of the acts constituting the offense, even if he actually knows
that gambling is occurring. Moreover, he has a motive to not expand
on this general knowledge: he benefits from the gambling by selling
90. Indeed, this is Sarch’s argument: “Given the pressing worries about over-criminalization
that other scholars have raised, one might wonder whether we really need yet another tool by which
to secure more criminal convictions. I argue that, despite these worries, my proposed expansion is
especially important in the white-collar context.” Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, supra note 63,
at 103. As I have argued elsewhere, efforts to expand criminal prosecutions of individuals in the
corporate context are generally misguided if understandable. Gilchrist, supra note 12, at 335.
Sarch’s substantive proposal differs from the procedural efforts I argued against; he urges
expanding the scope of what constitutes criminal conduct in the corporate sphere. Accordingly, he
avoids my objection that the burden of prosecutions would fall mostly on lower level employees.
However, my concern about tension with the rule of law remains given the inherent vagueness of
many white-collar criminal laws. Moreover, I worry that an expansion of criminal exposure such
as that envisioned by Sarch would create such a significant chilling effect on socially desirable risktaking in the corporate context that its full effects are difficult to imagine. Sarch’s suggestion,
however, is compelling, and a full discussion of its impacts and merits is beyond the scope of this
Article.
91. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 125 (2d ed. 1984).
92. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 43 n.58.
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more drinks from added traffic, and he seeks to evade culpability by
avoiding more specific knowledge. The fact of his knowledge is the
ultimate question in a contested case; the function of willful blindness
is to introduce a circumstantial means of proving knowledge based on
other facts.
There is almost never93 direct evidence of the relevant knowledge
(i.e., that the employer knew his business was being run in an illegal
way).94 In many hypotheticals, such as that offered by Williams about
an employer who “knew” about illegal conduct in his business, the
description concentrates on the fact of knowledge. As such, the
hypothetical aims to inform us about the defendant’s subjective mental
state at a particular time. The law presumes that there is a definite
answer to this question whether or not we have epistemic access to it.
In practice, however, the contentious issue is what set of facts,
established by a prosecutor, will permit a jury to find knowledge.
There is no direct evidence of a mental state, particularly one in the
past. Accordingly, knowledge, like all other mental states, can only be
proven circumstantially.95 The jury will be asked to extrapolate from
demonstrable facts to reach a conclusion about the defendant’s mental
state at a past point in time. Direct evidence will be about other facts—
for example, that revenues were always higher when a particular
employee worked, that the increased revenues centered on a back bar
in a private room, and that the employee had a history of running
games. A prosecutor might introduce proof of each of these facts, and
93. Exceptions may include confessions and contemporaneous documentation of the
defendant’s mental state (although even these are subject to error and as such are at least one step
removed from a type of truly direct evidence that never exists for mental states). Samuel W. Buell
& Lisa Kern Griffin, On the Mental State of Consciousness of Wrongdoing, 75 DUKE L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2012, at 133, 153.
94. As Justice Kennedy has observed:
Circumstantial facts like these tend to be the only available evidence in any event, for
the jury lacks direct access to the defendant’s mind. The jury must often infer knowledge
from conduct, and attempts to eliminate evidence of knowledge may justify such
inference, as where an accused inducer avoids further confirming what he already
believes with good reason to be true.
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 774 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95. There is considerable reason for skepticism about any clear line between direct evidence
and circumstantial evidence. Indeed, there may be reason to question whether direct evidence does
or could ever exist. See Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence,
45 HOUS. L. REV. 1801, 1805 (2009). With past mental states, skepticism about direct evidence is
stark. Some evidence is more direct than others, but even a video record of the defendant describing
his awareness of facts at a point in time require some deductions or inferences before a conclusion
about his state of mind can be reached.

(6) 54.2_GILCHRIST.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

WILLFUL BLINDNESS AS MERE EVIDENCE

4/23/21 9:47 AM

427

no other proof that the employer knew his business was hosting illegal
gaming. Posit that the objective truth of the matter is that the employer
did know his business was hosting illegal gaming (as in Williams’
hypothetical), but the question remains open as to whether that
knowledge can be proven based on the available evidence. Willful
blindness as a method of proof is merely the common-sense
recognition that actual knowledge can be established by this particular
kind of circumstantial evidence.
Some will object to limiting willful blindness to mere evidence
(as opposed to an extension of, or substitute for, actual knowledge) on
the basis that it is too limited: demonstrably culpable defendants will
be acquitted. There are, of course, two responses to this objection.
First, fundamental legality principles necessarily trump expediency or
appeals to a vague principle of justice; otherwise, we will have shifted
our discussion from law to mere power.96 That a person deserves to be
convicted, absent reference to public law, is simply not an argument
the law can recognize.97 Second, however, is a more pragmatic reply.
While the mere evidence approach avoids the legality problems that
accompany the substitute approach, it is less clear how many
outcomes would actually differ. One of the conceptual problems with
all willful blindness hypotheticals is that in the omniscient
presentation of the facts, the scenarios offer a truth-certain about the
defendant’s ultimate knowledge.
In reality, there may or may not be such a truth-certain,98 but trials
lack an epistemic method to ascertain it in any event. Trials operate
through evidence, which is necessarily akin to shadows on the wall of
Plato’s cave. In court, there is much talk of truth, but access to
objective truth is at best indirect: there is evidence, and there are
permissible inferences to be made from the evidence.
If arguments that the willfully blind are as blameworthy as the
knowing are correct—and by correct, I mean consistent with the

96. See Husak & Callender, supra note 17, 58–62. Husak and Callender would avoid the
legality problems and answer the pragmatic demands for liability by expanding statutes to punish
recklessness in some of these willful blindness scenarios. Id. While this proposal would work, there
is no reason to expect that courts will hold off on applying the well-established willful blindness
doctrine while awaiting legislative action on the matter, and little reason to expect legislative action
itself.
97. Id. at 62.
98. For more on the uncertainty of knowledge as a condition, see Ira Robbins’ discussion of
Karl Popper’s approach to the problem. Robbins, supra note 70, at 217–18.
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societal norms that govern much of criminal law—then one would
expect convictions for actual knowledge to be returned in many or
most cases of willful blindness, simply as a matter of evidence. The
jury would assess the evidence of willful blindness—evidence of
actual awareness of a high probability coupled with an affirmative
effort to avoid further knowledge—and from this infer knowledge.
They would infer knowledge because this category of mens rea is as
much a placeholder for a common-sense kind of culpability as it is an
analytically cohesive mental state.99
Williams’ hypothetical captures this mere evidence account of
willful blindness.100 There is no flaw or error in building knowledge
into a hypothetical about willful blindness; indeed, this is the point of
willful blindness under the method of proof account. The hypothetical
would be incomplete without this clarity.
Willful blindness is a condition which, when proven, can support
the conclusion that the defendant actually knew of the fact in
question.101 To evaluate whether this claim is justified, however, it is
important to consider the nature of knowledge at criminal law.
IV. THE MERE EVIDENCE ACCOUNT FITS WITH THE LAW’S SIMPLE
AND MORALLY-LOADED APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE
Much of the difficulty surrounding willful blindness can be traced
to confusion between knowledge as a philosophical concept and
knowledge as a legal instrument. While the question of when a person
can be said to know X is famously difficult (or impossible) for
philosophy,102 it is not and cannot be so for the law.103 The law
introduces “knowledge” as a functional concept, relying on fact
finders’ intuitions both about mental states and about justice.
99. For an instrumentalist account of substantive criminal law incorporating societal norms to
maximize its own legitimacy, see Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the
Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1840
(2000).
100. It is not clear that this was Williams’ intent, as in other places his account of willful
blindness more closely aligns with the substitute account. See, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW 159 (2d ed. 1961) (“A court can properly find willful blindness only where it can
almost be said that the defendant actually knew.” (emphasis added)). By introducing the possibility
of allowing willful blindness to establish knowledge where it could only be said the defendant
“almost knew,” Williams appears not to restrict willful blindness to a mere method of proof, but
anticipates it serving as a substitute.
101. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011).
102. See, e.g., Peter Unger, A Defense of Skepticism, 80 PHIL. REV. 198, 198 (1971).
103. See SARCH, supra note 8, at 8.
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Knowledge at criminal law is not an analytically pure concept; rather,
it is an instrument of justice based on common intuitions, susceptible
to change as normative intuitions about particular circumstances
vary.104 To understand the particular function of the willful blindness
doctrine, one must consider this distinction between knowledge as a
philosophical concept and knowledge as an instrument of criminal
law.
Ira Robbins describes knowledge at criminal law as “an
awareness of the existence of a particular fact or attendant
circumstance.”105 From this, he concludes that “one ‘knows’
something only if he or she is certain of it.”106 This is probably too
demanding a condition, as one struggles to conceive of certainty in a
meaningful sense. An hour ago, I parked my car outside the building.
I park here routinely and have no reason to believe my car has moved.
I have not seen my car in that hour, but I believe my car is parked
where I left it. I have a justified belief that my car remains where I left
it. I cannot, however, say I have certainty about that belief; but most
would conclude that, if my car remains where I parked it, I presently
have knowledge as to its location. This objection, however, is minor
and generally handled by reference to near certainty, a more realistic
precondition for the state we call knowing.107
Most philosophical accounts limit knowledge to justified true
beliefs. The criminal law does not. At criminal law, knowledge serves
a function of identifying a culpable mental state. While the
instrumental knowledge of law is plainly related to the philosophical
concept, the two are distinct.
The Gettier problem—a classic challenge for philosophical
accounts of knowledge—helps illustrate the differences between the
philosophical and criminal law accounts of knowledge. Gettier posits
that while justification, truth, and subjective belief may be necessary
for actual knowledge, they are not sufficient.108 The proof stems from
a series of hypotheticals in which one holds a particular belief about
X, that is true and justified, but it turns out that the believer’s
104. “No single definition of knowledge is universally agreed upon or regularly employed, even
within the limited context of criminal mens rea.” See Charlow, supra note 2.
105. Robbins, supra note 70, at 222.
106. Id.
107. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1373.
108. Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121, 121–23
(1963).
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justification is false while another justification, unknown to the
believer, supports the truth of the proposition.109
The use of knowledge in criminal law, however, is less
epistemically pure and more instrumental. Knowledge at criminal law
is a tool for identifying mens rea in the original sense: a guilty mind.110
By limiting culpability to cases of knowing action, the law seeks to
isolate a particular kind of culpability. Knowledge at criminal law is
ultimately a tool to distinguish and target particular wrongful
conduct.111
Classic examples of the Gettier problem simply do not pose a
challenge to the legal standard of knowledge; they would almost
certainly be sufficient to establish knowledge for purposes of criminal
liability, even as they confound philosophers. Suppose Omar hopes to
steal narcotics from a drug trafficker. He is told by a law enforcement
contact that a blonde woman with a turquoise headband and plaid
pants on a particular train will be carrying a suitcase with narcotics.
Omar boards the correct train, approaches a woman matching the
description as she sleeps, steals her bag and flees. It turns out that her
bag contained narcotics, but not because she was transporting it. Law
enforcement was entirely wrong about her involvement in the drug
trade; by whimsical chance her bag was mixed up with someone else’s
when she sat for coffee before boarding the train. Her actual bag
contained no narcotics, but the bag she came to possess of did contain
narcotics.
In this example, the Gettier problem suggests that Omar lacked
actual knowledge that he possessed narcotics, even though he had a
justified, true belief that he possessed narcotics. Omar’s belief
happened to be true and justified, but the justification was
unconnected to the truth of the proposition. He got lucky (so to speak).
109. Id.
110. “[T]he very same mental events can be knowledge or not knowledge depending on the
moral valence of the actions to which they are relevant and the pragmatic context in which the
action takes place.” James A. Macleod, Belief States in Criminal Law, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 497, 549
(2016).
111. The conventional account of modern criminal mental states is that they are descriptive.
James Macleod takes issue with this account, but acknowledges a descriptive component.
Ultimately he concludes that while there are descriptive elements of mental states in most modern
criminal codes, those descriptions are incomplete, relying on jurors employing evaluative concepts
to make their ultimate conclusions. “[C]urrent instructions employ concepts like ‘knowledge’ and
descriptions like ‘high probability’ that, on their most natural lay-interpretation, turn out to be both
descriptive and evaluative.” Id. at 549–50.
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There is little question, however, that Omar would be guilty of
knowing possession of narcotics. The law cares about culpable
mindset, not epistemic perfection.112 In this hypothetical, Omar did
possess narcotics and he believed he possessed narcotics. It seems that,
at criminal law, mere true belief may be sufficient for knowledge.
Justification may drop out altogether.
A more difficult case for criminal law might be imagined as a
further step away from the Gettier problem: the case of subjectively
unjustified true beliefs. Suppose Jiminy honestly believes that there is
marijuana in his trunk, because he wished upon a star that it would be
so. As it turns out, and entirely apart from his celestial requests, the
person who rented the car before him accidentally left marijuana in the
trunk. In this case, Jiminy has a true and honest belief, but not one that
is justified. Whereas Omar’s basis for his belief was sound but
erroneous, Jiminy’s basis is unsound. Would the law care? Barring a
mental illness or capacity defense,113 it seems not. Jiminy would be
guilty of possessing marijuana with a true and honestly held, though
unjustified, belief that he possessed marijuana. 114 In reaching this
same conclusion, Glanville Williams offered a less fanciful example:
“[S]uppose that the accused is charged with receiving stolen property:
when he received it, he thought it had been stolen by X from Y in
January, but actually it was stolen by X from Z in February. Here there
is the actus reus of receiving, and also the mens rea; it cannot be said
that the accused had no knowledge of the theft merely because he was
essentially right only by accident.”115
Recognizing knowledge as a gauge of culpability, distinct from
the epistemic condition of the same name, simplifies the concept
considerably. For purposes of criminal law, knowledge need not be
justified.

112. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1374–75 (describing knowledge at criminal law as requiring
only “belief, or subjective certainty, and the actual truth or existence of the thing known”).
113. These might be significant caveats. The criminal law evades much of the oddness of this
example by mental capacity excuses and mitigation. That, however, does not directly affect the
question of the nature of knowledge. Indeed, that limits on mental capacity can excuse otherwise
knowing conduct fits well with my claim that knowledge at criminal law is best understood as a
tool for gauging culpability.
114. See WILLIAMS, supra note 100, at 169 (“For legal purposes . . . to confine the word
‘knowledge’ to cases of rigorous scientific proof, or even to cases where reasonable steps have
been taken to verify the belief, would unduly restrict it.”).
115. Id.
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This is not to say, however, that justification does not matter.
Recognizing willful blindness as an evidentiary tool illustrates the
powerful role justification can play in establishing knowledge for
purposes of a criminal conviction. Namely, willful blindness allows
the fact finder to infer subjective awareness from the proof of truth
and justification. United States v. Jewell illustrates this approach.116
Jewell drove a car with 110 pounds of marijuana into the United
States, and was convicted of knowingly importing a controlled
substance. 117 That marijuana was in the car, “concealed in a secret
compartment between the trunk and rear seat,”118 was undisputed.119
That Jewell had some reason to believe he was transporting an illegal
substance was also undisputed.120 The evidence thus suggests he
would have been justified in actually believing there was marijuana121
in the car. Accordingly, the evidence established justification to
believe something true. The dispute hinged on Jewell’s subjective
belief: he testified that he did not know there was marijuana in the
trunk.122 The justification allowed the jury to reject this contention and
to conclude that he was actually aware he was transporting a controlled
substance.
There are, however, two ways to describe this result. First, Jewell
was punished for his willful blindness, distinct from actual knowledge,
because his conduct was equally culpable.123 This is the substitute
116. See generally United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976).
117. Id. at 697–98.
118. Id. at 698.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 698–99.
121. Or some controlled substance; the law is clear that knowing possession does not require
knowledge of the particular kind of controlled substance possessed. See McFadden v. United States,
576 U.S. 186, 192 (2015) (“That knowledge requirement may be met by showing that the defendant
knew he possessed a substance listed on the schedules, even if he did not know which substance it
was.”).
122. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 698.
123. The equal culpability of the defendant is generally recognized as the best justification for
willful blindness as something more than a mere method of proof. See, e.g., United States v. Poole,
640 F.3d 114, 122 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The rationale supporting the principle of ‘willful blindness’ is
that intentional ignorance and actual knowledge are equally culpable under the law.”). Alexander
Sarch relies on this justification to prescribe narrower limits for willful blindness instructions:
“courts should not give willful ignorance instructions in just any case of willful ignorance (as many
courts allow), but only when it is plausible that the defendant acted with a form of willful ignorance
that rendered her conduct as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct.” See Alexander Sarch,
Equal Culpability and the Scope of Willful Ignorance Doctrine, 22 LEGAL THEORY 276, 278
(2016). Sarch’s argument anticipates the central problem with all substantive willful blindness
models: it is punishment by analogy.
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approach, accepted in Jewell by the Ninth Circuit,124 and today by all
courts;125 this approach introduces the problems of punishment by
analogy and judicial extension of substantive criminal law.
Alternatively, Jewell could only be punished for knowingly
importing a controlled substance, but the evidence about his
justification for such alleged belief was deemed sufficient for the jury
to infer actual belief.126 Then-Judge Kennedy urged this approach in
his dissent.127 This alternative approach uses willful blindness only as
a method of proof, and as such it is considerably less radical and
problematic than the substitute approach. Barring the minority of cases
involving confessions or contemporaneous documentation of a mental
state, all contested mental states are proven indirectly;128 willful
blindness is but a common form of indirect proof.
V. THE MERE EVIDENCE ACCOUNT IS SUPPORTED BY THE HISTORY
OF WILLFUL BLINDNESS DOCTRINE
While the substitute account is now widely accepted, a mere
evidence account aligns better with the historic origins of the doctrine.
Those origins can be found in and around the navel yards of Britain.
Regina v. Sleep129 is generally identified as the earliest case in
which judges accepted the possibility that proof of willful blindness
might satisfy a statutory requirement of knowledge.130 To appreciate
124. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 698.
125. See Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102
YALE L.J. 2231, 2232 (1993).
126. By actual belief, I am referring to Ira Robbins’ formulation of knowledge: “an awareness
of the existence of a particular fact or attendant circumstance.” Robbins, supra note 70, at 222; see
supra note 70 and accompanying text. This definition seems to me to be both simplistic from an
analytic perspective and exactly correct from a legal perspective. The law, of necessity if not by
design, simplifies complex questions of cognition. What is knowledge to a juror? It is whether the
defendant was aware of something. Or, perhaps even more accurately, if more simplistically: it is
whether the defendant knew it. In court, common sense and folk psychology generally prevail over
philosophy of the mind and neuroscience.
127. Judge Kennedy dissented because the conviction was predicated on jury instructions that
permitted the substitute approach. He nonetheless pointed out, correctly, that the evidence of willful
blindness in the case would be sufficient to justify a conviction by a properly-instructed jury. See
Jewell, 532 F.2d at 708 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“We do not question the sufficiency of the
evidence in this case to support conviction by a properly-instructed jury.”).
128. Buell & Griffin, supra note 93, at 133, 153.
129. (1861) 169 Eng. Rep. 1296.
130. J. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD. L. REV. 294, 298 (1954) (“So
far as can be discovered, the case of R. v. Sleep was the first occasion in which judicial approval
was given to the notion that some lesser degree of knowledge than actual knowledge would be
sufficient to establish mens rea.”); Justin C. From, Note, Avoiding Not-So-Harmless Errors: The
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the origins of this doctrine, however, it is worth examining the case
and the context in which it arose.
In Sleep, the jury convicted the defendant of knowingly
possessing copper belonging to the government.131 Specifically, he
delivered to a ship a cask marked for delivery to one “Richard Pascoe,
Helston, Cornwall,” and when police searched the cask they
discovered 324 pounds of copper bolts in 150 pieces.132 Most of the
bolts had been melted down and reformed, but a significant fraction
retained the mark of a broad arrow,133 indicating the material was
property of the British government.134
As its empire expanded and its valuable government property
spread more widely, the British government faced the problem of
loss.135 The government needed to distribute materials, military and
administrative, across a widening empire.136 The scope of the
enterprise made keeping track of everything increasingly difficult. The
significance of the problem was such that it gave rise to new forms of
policing.137
People were taking England’s stuff. That necessitated police, and
it required keeping track of property. A pile of copper bolts could be
grabbed, pounded, melted, packed, and moved to a new location; the
Appropriate Standards for Appellate Review of Willful-Blindness Jury Instructions, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 275, 282 (2011) (“The willful-blindness doctrine first appeared in the English courts in
1861.”); Marcus, supra note 125, at 2233 (noting that “[w]illful blindness first appeared as a
substitute for actual knowledge in English case law over a century ago” in Regina v. Sleep);
Robbins, supra note 70, at 196; see also Rebecca Roiphe, The Ethics of Willful Ignorance, 24 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 187, 192 (2011) (“Willful blindness, known at the time as connivance, first
surfaced in the mid-nineteenth century in England.”).
131. Sleep, 169 Eng. Rep. at 1297.
132. Id. at 1296.
133. Id. at 1297.
134. Id.
135. See Seth W. Stoughton, The Blurred Blue Line: Reform in an Era of Public & Private
Policing, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 121–22 (2017) (“In 1797, thefts of cargo from boats on the
Thames led a small group of distinguished citizens, including celebrated jurist Jeremy Bentham, to
approach the West India Planters Committee and the West India Merchants Committees
associations with a proposal to create a private police force. With the permission of the government,
the Thames Police—officially the West India Merchants Company Marine Police Institute—began
operations the next year. Parliament passed the appropriately titled Act for the More Effectual
Prevention of Depredations on the River Thames to support England’s first preventative police
force. The Thames Police did not last long, but it sparked a broader interest in private efforts to
supplement the watch system. ‘By 1829[,] London had become a patchwork of public and private
police forces.’ A contemporary record reflects private police units operating in forty-five different
parishes within ten miles of London.” (alteration in original)).
136. Id.
137. See id.
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government lost and no one would be held accountable. The broad
arrow represented an important advance in inventory management,
and one that could be used to punish those who interfered with the
Crown’s property, while deterring others who might do so.138
Enter Mr. Sleep with over 300 pounds of copper probably
belonging to the British government, and the law began to develop. In
Regina v. Sleep, the court found itself confronting the difficulty of
proving knowledge.139
Knowledge began to appear in British anti-piracy statutes in the
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, originally as an
alternative to wittingly or willfully.140 Introducing a mental state as a
condition of guilt created a significant challenge of proof. As Queen’s
Counsel argued, “[i]f it were necessary for the prosecution to prove
knowledge, there would be great difficulty in obtaining a conviction.
It was the meaning of the legislature that the onus of excusing the
possession should be thrown on the prisoner.”141
Earlier courts had accepted exactly this argument. For example,
in refusing to import a mens rea requirement to a statute forbidding
possessing a game on a common carrier: “If it were necessary to aver
that the defendant had actual knowledge it would cast on the prosecutor a burden of proof which could not easily be satisfied . . . .”142
In Regina v. Sleep, however, the court rejected the argument,
noting that every statute includes a mens rea element unless mens rea
is expressly excluded.143 Still, the court addressed the issue as one of
proof: possessing material marked with a broad arrow may create a
presumption that the possessor knows the item is government
property, but the presumption can be rebutted and was in this case by

138. See Broad Arrow, 1 JOHNSON’S UNIVERSAL CYCLOPAEDIA 599 (rev. ed. 1888) (“Broad
Arrow, the British government mark placed upon all solid materials used in ships or dockyards, to
prevent embezzlement of royal stores. The origin of the mark is obscure. Before 1698 the
authorities prosecuted a dealer in marine-stores for having in his possession certain stores bearing
the broad arrow of his majesty. The defendant, when asked what he had to say, replied that it was
very curious that the king and he should both have the same private mark on their property. The
man was acquitted, and this led to the passing of a law that persons in possessions of stores or goods
of any kind marked with the broad arrow, shall forfeit all such goods, with £200 and costs.”).
139. Sleep, 169 Eng. Rep. at 1296.
140. 8 J. LL. J. EDWARDS, MENS REA IN STATUTORY OFFENSES 55 (1955).
141. Sleep, 169 Eng. Rep. at 1300.
142. The King v. Marsh (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 550.
143. Sleep, 169 Eng. Rep. at 1300.
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the defendant’s statement—accepted by the jury—that he was
unaware of the markings.144
Willful blindness comes up only at the end of the case, where two
justices comment on it as a viable alternative to more direct proof.
First, Justice Crompton posited that it would be “a crime for an
unauthorized person to have these stores in his possession, because the
sight of the broad arrow should put him upon inquiry, and so
knowledge that they are marked is essential.”145 Yet he immediately
then noted that this rule “would not apply where the prisoner’s eyes
are wilfully and deliberately shut to the truth.”146 Justice Willes
agreed, explaining that “[t]he jury have not found, either that the man
knew that the stores were marked, or that he wilfully abstained from
acquiring that knowledge.”147
The generally accepted historic account of willful blindness then
leaps fourteen years forward, to cases in which courts affirmed
convictions based on willful blindness. 148 To see the evidentiary
origins of willful blindness, however, it is worth looking back from
Regina v. Sleep where the doctrine was first described. The roots of
the doctrine can be traced to the development of the law of theft from
the very narrow common law crime of larceny to the broader category
of wrongful takings.
Theft at common law was limited to larceny, the unlawful taking
of property; it did not include the unlawful deprivation of property
lawfully taken.149 Thus, one who absconded with the property of
another without permission and with intent to deprive the owner of
possession was guilty of larceny, but one who unlawfully retained

144. Id. at 1301 (“[I]t is a fair presumption, where a man is found in possession of marked
articles, that he knew them to be marked; but that presumption may be rebutted by the
circumstances of the case. Here it is manifest, if the prisoner’s statement is to be believed, that he
was ignorant of the fact that the copper was marked; and the ordinary presumption is rebutted.”).
145. Id. at 1301–02.
146. Id. at 1302.
147. Id.
148. See Edwards, supra note 130, at 299–300 (first describing Bosley v. Davies (1875) 1 Q.B.
84 (Eng.); then Redgate v. Haynes (1876) 1 Q.B. 89 (Eng.)).
149. Michael Tigar traces this ancient distinction back to early Roman Law distinguishing
between the manifest thief, caught in the act of taking, and the non-manifest thief, caught merely
in unlawful possession of another’s property. Killing a manifest thief was justifiable homicide,
while the penalty for a non-manifest thief was capped at two-fold restitution. Michael E. Tigar, The
Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1446–47 (1984); see also FLETCHER,
supra note 73, at 31 n.9 (discussing the Ancient Roman statutory distinction between a thief caught
in the act and one that was not caught in the act).
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possession of property lawfully possessed was not guilty of larceny.150
Moreover, for some time this latter example was simply not a crime,
leaving a gap in the common law (at least as viewed from the modern
perspective).151
The actus reus of larceny was in the taking; absent coincidence of
taking with intent to wrongfully deprive, there could be no larceny.152
This rule changed dramatically over time. “At the risk of some
oversimplification we could say that the essential difference between
the traditional and modern approaches is that the former was oriented
toward the actus reus, while the latter is oriented toward the mens
rea.”153 Whereas traditionally only the taking was punished, now the
intent to deprive is punished.
This shift to hinging guilt on the defendant’s mental state carried
obvious evidentiary challenges.154 If the difference between larceny
and non-criminal wrongful possession turns on when, by whom, and
under what circumstances an item was acquired, the methods of proof
are relatively simple. However, “it is impossible to prove the state of
another man’s mind with the result that the defendant’s knowledge is
generally inferred from the nature of the act done.”155 Shifting to
questions of mental states clouds the evidentiary picture
considerably.156
The statutes at issue in broad arrow cases reflect an effort to
balance the need to criminalize wrongful takings of widespread
military supplies against the challenges of proving mens rea. The

150. See Tigar, supra note 149, at 1445–46.
151. George Fletcher suggests that this modern perspective, with its exponentially expansive
approach to substantive criminal law, has lost the “distinction between a public sphere of criminal
conduct and a private sphere subject at most to regulation by the rules of private law.” George P.
Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 472 (1976).
152. So a conviction for wrongful possession of a horse, absent proof of intent to deprive the
owner of the horse at the time it was hired, could not stand. See The King v. Pear (1779) 168 Eng.
Rep. 208.
153. Fletcher, supra 151, at 502. Tigar observed a different shift: from protecting possession to
protecting ownership. Tigar, supra note 149, at 1455–56 (“The importance of possession was deemphasized, while that of ownership—dominium—was elevated.”).
154. See Fletcher, supra 151, at 525–27.
155. EDWARDS, supra note 140, at 191.
156. See Fletcher, supra 151, at 525 (“When there is no close evidentiary link between the act
and the proscribed intent, the prosecution is forced to rely on the prospects of securing a confession
or testimony of the defendant’s incriminating admissions. When these forms of evidence are
unavailable, proof of the defendant’s unmanifested intent is likely to turn on even more
questionable forms of evidence.”).
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statute at issue in Regina v. Sleep is plain that its purpose is simplify
the proof required to convict for theft of government property.157
As the law was broadened to permit conviction not only for taking
“in the mainour,” but also for being found in possession, mens rea
assumed newfound significance. After all, if a person was found in
possession of goods rightfully belonging to another, his culpability
would depend entirely on his mindset. Had he bought them, or
innocently found them after another left them there, he might have no
culpability at all. This might also be true of one actually taking goods
from their rightful owner—i.e., under circumstances where he did not
know they belonged to another he would lack culpability—but these
circumstances are both rarer and more difficult to claim when caught
directly in the act of taking. Accordingly, mens rea gained new
importance as the substantive law of theft broadened beyond common
law larceny.
The proof component, nonetheless, loomed large. How to prove
a person’s mental state? Absent confession or contemporaneous
documentation, it can be done only circumstantially.158 This left plenty
of room for the defendant to falsify a story to counteract the
circumstantial evidence of mens rea.159 These evidence challenges
gave rise to willful blindness, originally conceived as connivance.160
Connivance, from the Latin connivere, meaning “to close the
eyes,” or to pretend ignorance,161 can be traced back further than even
willful blindness. Connivance was an element of the anti-bribery
statute forbidding any payment to or agreement with a naval, customs,
or excise official to “conceal or connive at” the breaking of
Parliamentary law.162
157. Regina v. Sleep (1861) 169 Eng. Rep. 1296, 1298 n.(a)1 (“Whereas notwithstanding divers
good laws made and enacted for the preventing of the stealing and imbezlement of his Majesty’s
stores of war and naval stores, those frauds, thefts, and imbezlements are frequently practised, and
the convicting of such offenders is rendered difficult and impracticable by reason it rarely happens
that direct proof can be made of such offender’s immediate taking, imbezling or carrying away any
of his Majesty’s said stores . . . .”).
158. EDWARDS, supra note 140, at 191.
159. See id. at 194.
160. Id. at 193–94.
161. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1364 n.57.
162. The King v. Hymen (1798) 101 Eng. Rep. 1118, 1118–19 (“This was an information by
the Attorney-General against the defendant for penalty of 500l. under the statute 24 Geo. 3, st. 2,
c. 47, s. 32, which enacts that ‘If any person shall give offer or promise to give any bribe,
recompence or reward to, or make any collusive agreement with any officer of the Navy, Customs
or Excise, to do, conceal or connive at any Act whereby any of the provisions made by this, or any
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This use of connivance, however, is entirely distinct from the
substitution of connivance, or willful blindness, for knowledge. For,
the agreement itself would satisfy actual knowledge on the part of the
official, even if he were merely conniving about the specific incident
that violated the law. So, for example, a merchant might bribe a
customs official to ignore his shipments for a few days in order to
avoid duties owed. The official accepting such a bribe is knowingly
accepting payment to allow the laws under his authority to be broken
even if he is merely blind to the specific items moved and duties
unpaid.
The same cannot be said of the person who acquires property
marked with a broad arrow, who recognizes the risk that it is so
marked, but who remained intentionally unaware of that fact. In this
hypothetical—like Regina v. Sleep—the defendant lacks knowledge of
the marking. What remains at issue is whether he lacks knowledge that
the material is government property. If he remains unaware of the
marking because he suspects it is government material, hopes to profit
from wrongfully possessing government material, and intentionally
avoids learning more to avoid culpability,163 a jury may conclude he
knew it was government property. This is the evidentiary use of willful
blindness.
VI. THE MERE EVIDENCE ACCOUNT GENERATES SIMILAR OUTCOMES
The legality problems generated by willful blindness ought to be
sufficient to inspire a change. Change, however, would be more
palatable if it gelled with popular intuitions that the willfully blind are,
sometimes, equally culpable as the knowing. The fewer outcomes that
change by reconceptualizing willful blindness as mere evidence, the
fewer objections to the shift. Willful blindness has gained widespread
acceptance for a reason: it aligns with people’s sense of justice. Any

other Act of Parliament relative to His Majesty’s Customs or Excise may be evaded or broken,
every such person shall for each offence (whether the same offer, proposal, promise or agreement
be accepted or performed or not) forfeit the sum of 500l.’”).
163. Robin Charlow’s willful blindness test is similar, but importantly different. Charlow
would allow willful blindness to substitute for knowledge where a person: “(1) is aware of very
good information indicating that the fact exists; (2) almost believes the fact exists; and (3)
deliberately avoids learning whether the fact exists (4) with a conscious purpose to avoid the
criminal liability that would result if he or she actually knew the fact.” Charlow, supra note 2, at
1429. The critical difference, however, is that Charlow is still advocating for a substitute account
of willful blindness, not an evidentiary account.
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proposal that deviates too far from that is unlikely to be adopted by
courts.164
Many of the conclusions predicated on claims of willful blindness
could just as well be described as knowledge.165 And, by describing
the mental state as knowledge—limiting willful blindness to mere, but
potentially significant, evidence of knowledge—courts would avoid
the serious problems posed by the substitute account.166 The results
would generally be the same, and the collateral harm to core principals
of legality would be significantly reduced.
Some outcomes would change. Husak and Callender describe the
three-suitcase hypothetical in which a foreigner approaches three
American tourists boarding return flights home.167 He offers to pay
each of them an unusually high fee if they each carry one suitcase back
to the States.168 He also assures them that two of the three suitcases
are empty and he will not tell them what is in the third.169 It is, of
course, a reasonable conclusion that one of the three contains
contraband. Indeed, were the hypothetical to involve but one suitcase,
the hypothesis of the instant article is that on these facts a jury could
rightly convict for knowing transport of contraband.170 But with three
suitcases, no one of the three tourists could be said to be aware she
was carrying contraband.171 To the contrary, more likely than not, each
tourist is not carrying contraband.172
Husak and Callender use this hypothetical to argue that willful
blindness that does not require awareness of even a high probability
of the fact in question.173 The authors’ goal is to describe willful
blindness in the manner most true to its purpose: to attach guilt to those

164. See Robinson, supra note 99, at 1861 (“The criminal law cares about layperson’s intuitions
of justice because their incorporation is essential to normative crime control.”).
165. Charlow, supra note 2, at 1360.
166. See Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 48–49.
167. See id. at 37–38 (this is the authors’ modification of a previously posited two-suitcase
hypothetical: “Suppose that the example is altered to involve three tourists, two of whose suitcases
were known to be empty.”).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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cases that present “the moral equivalent of knowledge.”174 By the
three-suitcase hypothetical, the authors suggest that “[t]he agent’s
estimation of the probability of the truth of a proposition does not seem
to be essential to judgments about whether he is wilfully ignorant.”175
This seems right if we accept that willful blindness ought to be
defined in alignment with the purpose of attaching guilt to cases that
present the moral equivalent of knowledge. Why is the person any less
blameworthy for accepting unusually high fees to knowingly engage
in conduct that has a 33 percent chance of being illegal than one who
does the same with a certainty of its illegality? The former is in a more
enviable position—it is likely she is getting paid for doing something
that poses no risk; but she’s demonstrated the same lack of respect for
the law as the person who engaged in the known misconduct.176 As
Husak and Callender conclude, however, that purpose is so plainly at
odds with legality principles—brashly introducing punishment by
analogy as an acceptable function—that it ought to be rejected
outright.177
A jury ought not convict a person of knowingly transporting
contraband if it concludes, based on the circumstantial evidence, that
she actually believed there was only a one in three chance she was
transporting contraband. Is her moral culpability meaningfully
different than someone like Jewell, who actually believed there was a
90 percent chance he was carrying contraband? Probably not. Under
the hypothetical, the one-in-three tourist (1) has a warranted suspicion
there is contraband in one of the suitcases, (2) could easily confirm
whether or not hers contains contraband, and (3) is motivated not to
confirm the truth by hopes of preserving a defense.178 These, more
than her degree of certainty, point to the moral equivalence of
knowledge. On the moral equivalence standard, she would be willfully
ignorant and thus guilty.

174. See id. at 36–39; see also Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766
(2011) (“The traditional rationale for this doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are
just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.”).
175. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 39.
176. Id.
177. “Using the equal culpability thesis to justify punishing the wilfully ignorant defendant
under a statute requiring that he act knowingly is to employ the very kind of analogical reasoning
condemned by the principle of legality.” Id. at 56.
178. See id. at 40–41.
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This, however, is not the standard adopted by courts, nor should
it be.179 Courts generally still require awareness of a high probability
of the fact in question.180 Each tourist in the three-suitcase
hypothetical ought to be acquitted, moral equivalence
notwithstanding. Because, moral equivalence is not a valid basis on
which to impose criminal liability.181
So, some instances of morally equivalence must be acquitted;
still, some significant number of willfully blind defendants could still
be convicted.
In most cases, the (sincere) wilfully ignorant defendant
would admit that he believes p, but would deny that he knows
p. On the assumption that knowledge consists of some kind
of externally justified true belief, this denial can only be
interpreted as an allegation that the quantum of justification
possessed by the willfully ignorant defendant is insufficient
to give rise to knowledge.182
Were knowledge at criminal law coextensive with the
philosophical concept, this would be a compelling defense.
But put it to a jury. Let the jury assess whether the defendant with
justified awareness of a high probability that a fact is true, who could
have easily confirmed that fact, but who did not because he sought to
avoid “guilty” knowledge, knew that fact or not. I would suggest more
often than not, with these conditions satisfied, the jury will find the

179. Sarch concludes otherwise, positing a duty to reasonably inform oneself before acting and
advocating for criminal liability for breach of the duty. SARCH, supra note 8, at 112. The instant
Article urges a simple remedy to a problematic doctrine that is likely to marginally contract the
scope of liability from the status quo. Fulsome consideration of Sarch’s duty-based doctrine is well
beyond the scope of my thesis. That said, I must admit real concern about the implications of an
approach that expands criminal exposure in this manner, for communal functioning, business
cultures, and the economy. That said, and in fairness to the proposal, it may be that there is a way
to mitigate these concerns by limiting which “substantial and unjustified risks” give rise to a duty
that could trigger criminal liability.
180. Charlow, supra note 2, at 1382 n.141.
181. The clarity of the three-suitcase hypothetical simultaneously obscures the question of
whether expanding liability to mere risk cases is prudent. In real life, there are no three-suitcase
scenarios. And there are no (or few) risks understood with anything like mathematical precision.
There is known bad conduct. Conduct that is probably bad. Conduct that seems a bit hinky. Conduct
that probably generates some risks but the engineer believes those risks are justified by anticipated
benefits. A criminal code ought to provide clarity. It should be minimalistic. The consequences for
criminal violations are severe, and people in an open society cannot be subject to the prospect of
criminal sanctions every time they miscalculate, or differentially calculate, risks and benefits.
182. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 46–47 (emphasis omitted).
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defendant guilty, not for being willfully blind, but rather for actually
knowing.183
Remember the hypothetical about an investor with concerns
about an unreasonably high agency fee in Saudi Arabia?184 I think she
knew the money would be used for bribes. Of course, it depends what
the meaning of know is, but we’ve been through that. Maybe you
agree, maybe you don’t. But put it to a jury, and I expect she would be
convicted. She knew enough to ask about the fee. She received an
absurdly unhelpful answer. What else could she possibly have thought
but that she was investing in a venture that would function in part
through paying bribes? That’s enough for a juror to conclude she
actually knew.185
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit appears to have adopted this view in the
seminal case, United States v. Jewell.186 “[I]n common understanding
one ‘knows’ facts of which he is less than absolutely certain. To act
‘knowingly,’ therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive
knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high probability
of the existence of the fact in question.”187 This is quite correct. It
reflects the common view about knowledge that juries are likely to
employ in any event.188 And, it is the reason that a shift to
conceptualizing willful blindness as but a form of evidence of
knowledge—as opposed to a substitute for knowledge—would have
only a limited impact on the outcomes of real-world cases. Generally,
cases presenting difficult questions of willful blindness are cases in
which juries are likely to conclude that the defendant had
knowledge—as they understand that term.
Courts have consistently rejected defense arguments that it is
error to instruct a jury as to willful blindness where there is evidence
from which the jury could find actual knowledge.189 “[A]ssuming
there to be sufficient evidence as to both theories, it is not inconsistent
for a court to give a charge on both willful blindness and actual

183. “Often this evidence will be enough to conclude that the defendant knows p, even if he
has not considered all the evidence that honest people would ordinarily consider.” Id. at 50.
184. See supra text accompanying note 35.
185. Assuming, as courts do sometimes instruct, that the jury did not conclude the defendant
had an affirmative belief that bribes would not be paid.
186. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976).
187. Id. at 700.
188. Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 53.
189. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1353–54 n.7.
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knowledge.”190 Were willful blindness conceptualized as a method of
proving knowledge, rather than a substitute for knowledge, this rule
would be as obvious as it would be unnecessary. A jury could find
knowledge based on any kind of circumstantial evidence, and
evidence that the defendant was actually aware of a high probability
of the material fact and deliberately sought to avoid confirming that
probability could be accepted by a jury in making the cognitive leap
from objective facts about the world to the subjective state of the
defendant at some earlier time.191
And very often one would expect the jury to make precisely this
leap. Consider the case of Sandra Wert-Ruiz, convicted of conspiracy
to launder drug money through her money remitting business. 192 On
appeal, Wert-Ruiz contended it was error to instruct on willful
blindness, because the only evidence was of actual knowledge.193 She
argued that “each piece of the government’s evidence can be
interpreted in only one of two ways: either she was a knowing
participant in the conspiracy (if the government’s evidence is
believed) or she was an unknowing innocent who became ensnared in
it (if the government’s evidence is not believed).”194
This binary division between knowing and not knowing ought to
be the standard approach to any case where the relevant statute
requires knowledge for a conviction. The introduction of a grey area—
a not-quite-knowing-but-just-as-reprehensible kind of ignorance—is
the original sin of the substitute account. Eliminating this third
category between knowing and not knowing, however, would not
eliminate the facts upon which it is predicated. In Ms. Wert-Ruiz’s
case, there was evidence from which a jury could conclude she had
knowledge of the source of the moneys she remitted: the use of coded
language, the elimination of a zero when discussing denominations,
the creation of false receipts.195
In defending the provision of a willful blindness instruction, the
appellate court referred to Ms. Wert-Ruiz’s own statements as
evidence from which a jury might conclude she was merely willfully

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 252 (3d Cir. 2000).
Charlow, supra note 2, at 1360.
Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d at 252.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id. at 254.
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blind.196 When asked by an investigating agent whether she “thought
the money came from the sale of narcotics, ‘[Wert-Ruiz] replied that
she was an educated woman, and where else would money come from
in that amount.’”197 The court then describes this critical evidence as
follows:
This statement, if credited by the jury, would indeed suggest
actual knowledge and not willful blindness. Still, in
juxtaposition with Wert-Ruiz’s claims at trial not to have
known the source of the funds, it could arguably be viewed
as an example of willful blindness—in other words, she
never asked questions while participating in the conspiracy,
but when the truth was revealed she was not at all surprised
about what really had happened.198
Query: what is the difference between these possibilities? Perhaps
there is a difference of degree. An educated woman receiving large
quantities of cash in gym bags for remittance, from people who spoke
in code and consistently described numbers as one-tenth their actual
value, would certainly suspect that she was receiving proceeds from
an illegal activity. But more than that, might we not conclude that she
actually knew this fact? On the other hand, there are plenty of facts we
would conclude she did not know. Who sold drugs to whom? There is
no reason to believe she would or could have known the details of
individual transactions. But that is immaterial: money laundering
requires only knowledge “that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful
activity.”199 Indeed, the government need not even prove that she was
aware that the money was from the illegal sale of narcotics; awareness
that the money was derived from “some form of unlawful activity”
would be sufficient.200
So, how to describe Ms. Wert-Ruiz’s mental state regarding the
source of moneys? She must have had at a minimum strong suspicion
that the money stemmed from an illegal activity. It might have been
any number of illegal activities: fraud, extortion, embezzlement, or the
sale of non-narcotic contraband like certain firearms or child
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 257.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2011).
See id.
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pornography. These, however, are significantly less likely, if only
because each represents a smaller, more rarified market with fewer
proceeds than the drug dealing. So, Ms. Wert-Ruiz would have
significant suspicion that this was money from an illegal activity,
probably drug dealing. Really, we—or more consequentially, a jury—
might describe her as Glanville Williams described the employer who
knew his business was being run in an illegal way but avoided learning
the details.201 We can call this condition willful blindness—as did
Williams202—but we are simply describing a form of knowledge. The
evidence—some of which might look like willful blindness—was
sufficient for the jury to conclude that Ms. Wert-Ruiz was actually
aware the money she was remitting was derived from illegal
activity.203 There is really no need for anything more.
Defendants frequently appeal convictions where willful blindness
instructions were given on the basis that there was insufficient
evidence to merit the willful blindness instruction.204 Courts generally
rule that “[a]s long as separate and distinct evidence supports a
defendant’s deliberate avoidance of knowledge and the possibility
exists that the jury does not credit the evidence of direct knowledge, a
willful blindness instruction may be appropriate.”205 This rule is
predicated on the substitute account of willful blindness, and as
formulated, it clarifies how flawed that account is.
Here again we see that epistemic confusion undergirds most
courts’ descriptions of willful blindness. What is “evidence of direct
knowledge?” Or, perhaps more simply, what is direct knowledge?
There is no such thing. Knowledge, at law, is the subjective awareness
of a sufficiently high probability—maybe a near certainty—that a
particular fact does or will be true.206 When Bob pulls the trigger on a
loaded gun aimed at William’s head, barring facts allowing for an
alternate explanation, we will readily conclude that Bob was
subjectively aware he was about to cause William’s death or serious
bodily harm. Perhaps the First Circuit is using the phrase “direct
knowledge” to refer to subjective awareness of facts predicated on the
defendant’s own senses. Used this way, one could say that Mr. Jewell
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 125.
Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d at 257.
See United States v. Bilis, 170 F.3d 88, 92–93 (1st Cir. 1999).
Id. at 93.
Charlow, supra note 2, at 1373.
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lacked direct knowledge of the 110 pounds of marijuana in his trunk,
because he never saw it with his own eyes.
This, however, introduces a curious—if understandable—
segmentation and prioritization of justifications. “I saw it with my own
eyes,” is as flawed a justification as it is popular. Our own eye—our
sensory perceptions—are not necessarily the best justification for
beliefs. Senses can be mistaken; senses can be tricked. Direct
knowledge—if by that the court means knowledge justified by
reliance on one’s own sensory perception—is not uniformly better
than indirect knowledge (i.e., knowledge justified by reasonable
deductions or inferences from other known facts).
The phrase, “evidence of direct knowledge,” whether
intentionally or not, suggests a different phrase: direct evidence of
knowledge. Of course, this is what is always and necessarily lacking
when the law seeks information about a person’s subjective mental
state at an earlier time.207 There is only indirect, circumstantial
evidence of knowledge.208 Some circumstantial evidence of
knowledge is relatively direct: for example, a clear video showing Mr.
Jewell open the trunk, look at over 100 pounds of marijuana, and
hurriedly close the trunk. Some circumstantial evidence of knowledge
is less direct: for example, accepting large bags of cash for remittance
from people who speak in code. But to be clear, neither case involves
direct evidence; there is and could be no such thing when referring to
past mental states. 209 Inferences are required even in the Jewell-video
hypothetical: that he saw the marijuana; that he understood it to be
narcotics; that his vision and brain were functioning normally at the
time.
On this spectrum between certain knowledge and certain
recklessness, with only circumstantial evidence to rely on, many
willful blindness cases could just as easily be knowledge cases in
which willful blindness serves as the relevant circumstantial evidence.
That is, convictions secured through the substitute of willful blindness
generally could be secured through a mere evidence approach.

207. Id. at 1359.
208. Id. at 1359–60.
209. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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The case of United States v. Anthony210 is instructive. The
defendant mounted a Cheek211 defense to allegations of tax evasion,
contending that his good faith belief that he had no duty to pay taxes
negated the required element of a “voluntary, intentional violation of
a known legal duty.”212 On appeal he argued in part that the court erred
by instructing on willful blindness because there was no independent
evidence of willful blindness (as opposed to actual knowledge).213 The
First Circuit rejected this argument noting that the defendant presented
evidence of personally researching old Supreme Court cases and tax
codes, but conceded on cross examination that he had not read new
Supreme Court cases or the current tax code and regulations.214
“Based on this, the jury could reasonably infer that, even if Anthony’s
claim that he did not know of his duty was credible, his lack of
knowledge depended on his deliberate refusal to extend his research
to more current, authoritative sources.”215 That is one way to describe
the defendant’s mental state. Another would be that he knew—as
much as anyone ever knows anything—that he had a duty to pay taxes,
and he conducted selective research to rebut this position. How could
a jury conclude that he knew of his duty? The same way they ever
make conclusions about mental states. The defendant’s credibility, the
reasonableness of his claimed belief,216 the explanation for his claimed
belief—these would help the jury conclude what a defendant truly
believed at some past point in time about his duty to pay taxes or about
whether there were drugs in the trunk.
Adding willful blindness as a substitute does not—and ought
not—significantly expand the scope of criminal conduct. But it will
expand it somewhat, as demonstrated by the three-suitcase
hypothetical. On a substitute approach bounded only by moral
equivalence, the defendant would be guilty; on a mere evidence
210. 545 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2008).
211. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 196 (1991).
212. Anthony, 545 F.3d at 64 (quoting Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200).
213. Id. at 65.
214. Id. at 66.
215. Id.
216. The Supreme Court held in Cheek that reasonableness is not necessary for a good faith
defense against a claim of a willful violation, however, reasonableness plays a significant and
recognized role in such cases. “Of course, the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or
misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple
disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government
has carried its burden of proving knowledge.” Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203–04.
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approach, the jury may conclude he lacked knowledge of the contents
and acquit him.
Today, the three-suitcase hypothetical is no longer really about
suitcases; today, it is more likely to be considered in relation to
corporate misconduct. The relative dearth of prosecutions of
individuals following high-profile cases of corporate malfeasance has
led to scholarly,217 judicial,218 and political219 criticism, as well as to
policy shifts.220 The nature of the corporate hierarchy renders
individual corporate prosecutions difficult and thus relatively rare.221
Basically, most corporate crimes are crimes of knowledge, and higher
level executives frequently lack actual knowledge of the specific actus
reus.222 Willful blindness is thus a critical tool in white collar
prosecutions,223 and a tempting hook for those who would expand
criminal liability throughout corporate organizations.224
Full inquiry into this topic is well beyond the scope of this Article.
However, it is worth first acknowledging that a potential weakness of
the mere evidence account of willful blindness is that it is restrictive,
rather than expansive.225 If the goal of studying willful blindness is to
capture more conduct within the bounds of criminality, the substitute
account will serve that goal and the mere evidence account will not.
217. See generally MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE
CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET 1 (2017); David
M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1277 (2016).
218. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financialcrisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/.
219. John Lanchester, After the Fall, LONDON REV. BOOKS (July 5, 2018), https://www.lrb.
co.uk/v40/n13/john-lanchester/after-the-fall.
220. See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Individual
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/76903
6/download.
221. See Gilchrist, supra note 12, at 361.
222. Id.
223. Famously, Frederick Bourke was convicted of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act based on a government theory that when the wealthy designer of handbags invested
in the oil venture of another businessman, he was willfully blind to the likelihood that illegal bribes
would be paid. United States v. Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369, 372, 385, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d,
667 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Second Circuit has held that conscious avoidance may satisfy
the knowledge component of the intent to participate in the conspiracy.”).
224. See SARCH, supra note 8, at 231.
225. For reasons I have argued elsewhere, see generally Gilchrist, supra note 12. I believe this
is more likely a benefit. See also Husak & Callender, supra note 17, at 49 (noting that “[o]ne can
reason and reflect upon all one’s available evidence in the most scrupulous possible fashion and
still lack knowledge”).
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My contention is that in the mine run of cases, the mere evidence
approach is likely to generate the same outcome as the substitute
approach. But not all cases. So, the three-suitcase hypothetical, and
maybe more to the point, a twenty-three-suitcases hypothetical, may
be resolved with guilty verdicts under a substitute-equal-culpability
account and by acquittals under the mere evidence account. Plainly,
this will affect corporate criminal prosecutions, where higher level
executives frequently have only awareness of risks, rather than
knowledge.226
Second, having acknowledged this potential weakness, I would
argue it is not a weakness at all. It is a limitation of the power of law.
The law frequently fails to reach popular or even desirable results;
that, itself, however, is no reason to alter the result.227
VII. THE MERE EVIDENCE ACCOUNT CANNOT COMPLETELY
RESOLVE CONCERNS ABOUT WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
The first two evils associated with the substitute account of
willful blindness—judicial usurpation of legislative function228 and
punishment by analogy229—would be eliminated by the mere evidence
approach. However, the third evil associated with willful blindness—
allowing conviction for knowing violations based on mere
recklessness230—would only be curtailed to a lesser degree, if at all.
This objection is fundamentally about the risk of wrongful
conviction, and it has less to do with willful blindness—whether as
evidence or a substitute account—than it does with the inherent
imprecision of the legal definition of knowledge.
As described above, the law’s conception of knowledge is
importantly different, more simplistic, and more morally contingent
than that aspired to by philosophy. To some degree, this stems from
the necessary concession that knowledge of a future event or result can
226. Gilchrist, supra note 12, at 382.
227. It may be, however, a reason to alter the law. Indeed, for those who would use willful
blindness to expand criminal accountability within the corporate hierarchy, statutorily amending
the relevant codes to punish certain kinds of risk-taking is worth exploring. For more, see Peter J.
Henning, A New Crime for Corporate Misconduct?, 84 MISS. L.J. 43, 50 (2014) (exploring
“possible approaches to adopting a statute that would permit federal prosecutors to pursue cases
against corporate executives for their managerial decisions—decisions that result in significant
economic harms, like those seen in the 2008 financial crisis”); SARCH, supra note 8, at 231.
228. See supra Part II.A.
229. See supra Part II.A.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 83–84.
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only be awareness that the event or result is practically certain to
occur.231 There is no certainty. Bob points a loaded gun at William’s
head and pulls the trigger. Should William be killed by the gunshot, a
jury will no doubt conclude that Bob knowingly caused William’s
death. But Bob, upon pulling the trigger, could have possessed
certainty as to that outcome only through ignorance. He may or may
not have been cognizant at the time of the alternative results, but they
included at a minimum that the gun would jam, that the bullet would
miss, and that the bullet would hit its target but inflict less-thanexpected damage. Allowing awareness of these contingencies would
render knowing crimes impossible—it would eliminate the category
altogether. Accordingly, awareness of a practically certain result is
sufficient for knowledge.232 Permitting knowledge with
contingencies, however, renders knowledge a question of risk—like
recklessness.
Acting with awareness of a substantial and unjustified risk that a
particular result might occur is merely reckless.233 The line between
knowledge and recklessness, therefore, is only one of degree admitting
of limited precision. When Bob points a gun a William’s head and
pulls the trigger, the chance of William’s death is great enough that
the jury is comfortable assigning knowledge of this result to Bob. Yet,
when Sally agrees to drive drunk, only to hit and kill Amy as a result
of her intoxication, no jury will find this a knowing killing. Sally was
aware of a substantial and unjustified risk of death to another by her
driving while intoxicated; she acted anyway and caused a death. This
is textbook recklessness, and the jury will have little difficulty
discerning it from knowledge.
Between these poles, however, lie necessarily harder cases. The
tavern owner who collects triple revenue on Thursday nights, who
knows his bartender has a history of running illegal games, who makes
a point of taking Thursdays off. The man who accepts an unusual fee
to drive a car across a border, no questions asked. The woman who
remits bags of cash in a legitimate business established to move money
between countries. These are the willful blindness cases, and they are
231. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 9 (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“The inference of ‘knowledge’
of an existing fact is usually drawn from proof of notice of high probability of its existence, unless
the defendant establishes an honest, contrary belief.”).
232. Id.
233. Id. § 2.02.
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difficult whether willful blindness remains a substitute for knowledge
or whether it is reconceptualized as a form of evidence from which
one might infer knowledge. In either event, there is a chance juries
will get it “wrong.”234 Because the line between knowledge and
recklessness is one of degree, there is always the chance that a jury
will find knowledge where a more accurate account would identify
mere recklessness. This risk stems not from willful blindness, but from
the imprecise delineation between the category of knowledge and that
of recklessness, and from the impossibility of an error-free system.
Moreover, limiting the categories represented on the spectrum
between plain knowledge and plain recklessness might actually
mitigate the problem. Instructing a jury that they must find knowledge
or willful blindness, as happens with a substitute account of willful
blindness, generates a heuristic of three categories along what is truly
a fluid spectrum.235 First, knowledge, followed by willful blindness,
followed by recklessness. This model may generate more convictions
than a binary knowledge/recklessness model if only because it asks
the trier of fact to imagine three segments of the spectrum, and
designates two of them as sufficient for conviction.
Of course, this need not be true; there is nothing inherent in a
greater raw number of convictable categories that will necessarily
expand the scope of liability; however, the greater number of
categories sufficient for guilt is unlikely to decrease the number of
convictions and may, as a simple matter of confirmation bias, lead to
more convictions. That is, as many critics have suggested, it may lead
jurors to assign guilty knowledge to what—absent the willful
blindness substitute category—would otherwise be mere
recklessness. 236
In any event, while it is not clear that the mere evidence approach
adequately responds to the wrongful conviction/mere recklessness
objection, it at least does not aggravate the problem.

234. Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 76 (1999) (“[E]rrors cannot be entirely eliminated from the process of
criminal adjudication and that mistakes will inevitably occur.”); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525 (1958) (“There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which
both parties must take into account.”).
235. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2008).
236. See Charlow, supra note 2, at 1355–56.
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CONCLUSION
Does theory matter? Many ask whether legal scholarship is too
concerned with castles in the sky while practitioners toil in the dirt.
The premise is unfair in both directions.237 Lawyers must embrace
theory if they are to craft fulsome and compelling arguments; scholars
must embrace practical implications if they are to earn an audience.
The theory of willful blindness serves as an exemplar of just how
important theory is, and how intertwined with practice it must be.
The dominant account of willful blindness offered by courts is
deeply problematic. However, it is clear. Willful blindness is an
acceptable substitute for knowledge because those who act in a
willfully blind manner are equally culpable as those who act
knowingly. Willful blindness is therefore an acceptable substitute for
knowledge.
To describe the account is to recognize its deeply flawed nature.
Courts lack authority to legislate alternative categories of crime, and
to do so by way of moral analogies evidences a complete disregard for
rule of law. This theoretical problem threatens the perceived
legitimacy of the legal system; and yet it is so easy to avoid. A
conceptual shift, from a theory of substitution to a theory of evidence,
avoids the legality problems entirely. And, the shift would likely
change relatively few outcomes.
The history and theory of the willful blindness doctrine fit with
the mere evidence account. The mere evidence account avoids the
legality pitfalls. And, the mere evidence account works in the sense
that it generates similar outcomes. When it comes to willful blindness,
the practice is not particularly problematic, but the theory is. That
ought to change.

237. See Heather K. Gerken, Resisting the Theory/Practice Divide: Why the “Theory School”
Is Ambitious About Practice, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 134, 135 (2019).
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